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Suppressing SARS-CoV-2, the causative agent of COVID-19, requires that infected indi-
viduals are rapidly identified and isolated, on an ongoing basis. However, regular testing
of every individual is expensive. We present an approach to pooled testing, based on the
geometry of a hypercube, which enables fast, cost-effective identification of infected people
when the prevalence of the virus is low. Field trials of this approach are now under way in
Rwanda.
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1SARS-CoV-2 represents a major threat to global health. Rapidly identifying and quarantining
infected individuals is one of the most important strategies available to contain the virus. However,
each diagnostic SARS-CoV-2 test costs 30-50 US dollars [1]. Therefore, testing every individual in
a population regularly, as may be essential to eliminating the virus, is very expensive. The costs
are unaffordable for most low-income countries with limited resources for massive SARS-CoV-2
testing. It is therefore important to ask: are there more efficient ways to find infected people?
The first step in testing, swab collection, is labour intensive but does not require expensive
chemicals or equipment. It may therefore be feasible to collect swabs regularly from everyone. The
next step involves RT-PCR machines [2]. These require expensive chemical reagents, currently in
short supply, as well as skilled personnel. Reducing the cost requires that we minimize the number
of tests. Testing rapidly is also vital because SARS-CoV-2 is so infectious. Any time wasted during
testing results in a higher prevalence of the virus, which spreads quickly [3].
To find infected individuals, the naive approach is to test everyone. For a group of size N , this
takes N tests. However, far fewer tests are actually needed, especially at low prevalence. It is much
more efficient to pool (or combine) samples and test them together. Pooling samples has already
been discussed as a way to efficiently estimate the prevalence of the virus [4, 5]. Our focus here is,
instead, on how to use pooling of subsamples to identify infected individuals.
The idea of group testing dates back to a paper of Dorfman in 1943 [6]. Dorfman’s algorithm
reduces the number of tests per person, required to find all infected individuals, to ≈ 2√p at low
prevalence p (see Appendix A). We shall describe an algorithm which requires only ≈ ep ln(1/p)
tests per person at low p, substantially improving on Dorfman’s. Our algorithm is largely parallel,
so that finding an infected individual usually happens in a single step. There are algorithms which
require fewer tests, such as binary searches. However, they are adaptive and hence serial. As the
prevalence falls, the optimal group size N grows, and adaptive searches take longer and longer.
During this time, the disease continues to spread. We detail below how, at low prevalence (see, e.g.,
Ref. [7]), this effect disfavours adaptive searches. Among parallel algorithms, ours scales similarly
to the best ones known in the literature (see Appendix B).
Group testing is most obviously effective when there are no infected individuals at all. When
the samples from a group are pooled and tested together, just one test suffices to show that no-one
is infected. Our algorithm takes full advantage of this powerful result. As we shall see, the optimal
group size N is chosen so that the first test, conducted on the whole group, is usually negative.
Now consider the case where only one individual is infected. The idea behind our algorithm is
geometrical: we pool subsamples, prior to testing, in the pattern suggested by a high-dimensional
hypercube. The group of individuals to be tested is represented by a set of N points on a cubic
lattice in D dimensions, organized in the form of a hypercube of side L, with
LD = N. (1)
Instead of directly testing the sample taken from each individual, we first divide it into D equal
subsamples. These DN subsamples are recombined as follows. Slice the hypercube into L planar
slices, perpendicular to one of the principal directions on the lattice. Form such a set of slices in
each of the D principal directions. Altogether, there are DL slices, each consisting of N/L = LD−1
points. We combine the LD−1 subsamples corresponding to each slice. If there is just one infected
individual, then one slice out of the L slices, taken in each of the D directions, will yield a positive
result. That slice directly indicates the coordinate of the point corresponding to the infected
individual, along the associated principal direction.
Therefore the number of tests required to uniquely identify the infected individual is
DL = DN1/D, (2)
2where we used (1). Treating D as a continuous variable, the right hand side of (2) diverges at both
small and large D, possessing a minimum at
D = lnN, (3)
corresponding to L = e and a total of e lnN trials. In reality, D and L must be integers, but using
L = 3 achieves almost the same efficiency. With no further constraint, finding one infected person
in a group of 106 individuals would require only 38 tests, performed in just one round of testing.
In practice, we are limited by the capacity of the testing machine. A typical swab yields 105
viral RNA molecules/ml [8]. For each slice of the hypercube, we combine N/L subsamples of the
virus, each of volume v. If the volume of each combined sample, V = Nv/L, exceeds the capacity
of the PCR we will have to only use a portion of it. We should also keep in mind that at least 1
viral RNA is needed for an unambiguous result, and we must remain well above this limit.
Setting L = 3 and N = 3D, we find
D =
ln(V/v)
ln 3
+ 1 (4)
For example, if V/v = 100 then (4) yields D ≈ 5, from which (3) yields N = 243. If v is a
microliter, then V is 100 microliters. In a positive combined sample, there would be 100 viral RNA
molecules. Even if only 10 microliters are used in the PCR machine, it would contain 10 viral RNA
molecules, sufficient for a positive result. The typical number of tests required to find the infected
individual is then only 3 lnN ≈ 17, an efficiency gain of 14.
As a proof of concept, using oropharyngeal swab specimens collected during COVID-19 surveil-
lance in Rwanda, we have shown that positive specimens can still be detected even after they are
diluted by up to 100 fold (i.e. V/v = 100; Figure 1). Sample pooling is now used for cost-effective,
large scale testing in Rwanda to understand the spatial spread of SARS-Cov-2 nationally and
identify new infection hotspots to enable a rapid response by public health officials.
Note that the viral load found in a swab specimen is relatively low if collected during the early
stages of viral replication [8]. Therefore, swabs taken during this period may contain insufficient
virus to yield a positive result. The sensitivity of the test is typically increased by testing specimens
collected at sequential time points. Methods like the one we describe here facilitate such sequential
testing on a massive scale by drastically reducing the associated costs. In view of the large potential
efficiency gains, it is worth exploring whether testing machines could be engineered to accommodate
larger test volumes.
We have so far assumed there is just one infected individual in the group to be tested. However,
we cannot know this ahead of time. What if there are 2, 3 or more infected people present? The
number of infected individuals present in a group of size N , at prevalence p, should be described
by Poisson statistics with mean λ = pN . For λ significantly below unity, the probability to find
m infected individuals decreases rapidly with m. As we shall see, this is the regime in which our
algorithm is most efficient.
We summarize the algorithm as follows:
(i) For a given initial estimate of the prevalence p, select the group size N to be the optimal
power of 3, discussed below. Test the whole sample to see whether one or more infected
individuals are present. A negative test indicates everyone in the group is clear of infection.
(ii) If the test is positive, run one round of testing according to the hypercube algorithm with
L = 3. The distribution of results for the LD slices should, for large N , accurately indicate
the number m of infected individuals, with many consistency checks including a new estimate
of the prevalence. If m=1, the infected individual is immediately identified.
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Figure 1: Positive samples are detected after a 100-fold dilution.
Shown are representative RT-PCR fluorescence curves obtained by amplifying SARS-COV-2 E-gene in two
positive samples diluted in ratios of 1:20, 1:50, and 1:100 using equal volumes of 19, 49, and 99 negative
samples, respectively. For comparison, a fluorescence curve from a positive control is also shown.
(iii) If m = 2, select a principal direction in which two slices are positive. Take one of these, itself
a hypercube of dimension D − 1, and run the hypercube algorithm again. The coordinates
of the corresponding infected individual are then uniquely identified, and those of the second
infected individual are inferred by elimination.
(iv) If m > 2, select a principal direction in which all three slices are positive. Taking one of
these, run the hypercube algorithm again. If that slice contains one infected individual, it
is immediately identified. If the slice contains 2 or 3 infected individuals, their coordinates
are discovered in 1 or 2 additional hypercube runs. The last infected individual is found by
elimination. So, for m = 1, 2 or 3, only m runs are needed.
(v) For m > 3, it is an exercise in combinatorics to work out the expected number of runs. This
turns out to be a number slightly higher than m. The corrections to m for m = 4, 5, 6 are
given in Appendix B. For reasons given there, these corrections turn out to be relatively
unimportant.
In Appendix B we show that, for given prevalence p, the number of tests per person is mini-
mized for a group size N ≈ 0.350/p, and that its minimal value is ≈ ep ln(0.734/p). For preva-
lences p in the ranges {(2.3, 0.78), (0.78, 0.26), (0.26, 0.09), (0.09, 0.03)} per cent, the optimal group
sizes N are {27, 81, 243, 729} and the efficiency gains over naive testing are in the respective
ranges{(5, 10), (10, 24), (24, 61), (61, 160)}.
We now compare our search algorithm with those already considered, for diverse purposes,
in computer science or mathematical statistics. Information theory sets a lower bound on the
number of tests per person required to identify an infected individual (see Appendix B). At low
p, this bound is ≈ p log2(1/p). Binary searches approach this limit by performing an iterated
series of tests (see, e.g, Refs. [9, 10]). These algorithms require fewer tests than ours by a factor
of e ln 2 ≈ 1.88. However, when considering a rapidly spreading infectious disease like COVID-19,
saving time is important because infected individuals who are still at large can infect others. A
parallel, or largely parallel, search such as ours reduces this risk. In contrast, binary searches are
adaptive and must be performed serially. At low prevalence, the optimal group size N scales as 1/p
4(see Appendix A). A binary search takes log2N ∼ log2(1/p) steps to find an infected individual [9].
Each PCR test takes several hours, to which must be added any time taken for subsample sorting
and selection. So, multiple of rounds of testing would consume significant time. During this period,
the prevalence p of the virus grows exponentially. The doubling time for the virus is somewhat
uncertain but it has been recently estimated, using data from China [3], to be τ2 ≈2.4 days. If
each PCR test takes τ days, the viral prevalence grows by ∼ (1/p)τ/τ2 during an adaptive search.
It follows that, at fixed τ/τ2, the adaptive algorithms do worse at low p. For example, if we assume
that at most 3 rounds of adaptive PCR tests may be performed in a working day, then τ = 1/3 day.
For prevalences p below (e ln 2)−τ2/τ ≈ 1 per cent, a parallel approach like ours is then preferred.
Reducing the costs of staff and lab time also favours a largely parallel strategy.
Another key consideration is robustness to error. A search method such as ours allows for many
consistency checks which will help to eliminate false positives or negatives. In contrast, binary
searches rely on repeated testing of the positive sample, making errors harder to identify.
The most striking consequence of our approach is that the cost of testing the whole population
falls rapidly as the prevalence declines. This should incentivize decision-makers to act firmly
in the early phases of the pandemic. Although driving the prevalence down initially is costly,
maintaining a low prevalence thereafter and, indeed, eliminating COVID-19 altogether, will become
progressively more affordable.
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Appendix A: Comparison with Dorfman
In a landmark paper in 1943, R. Dorfman considered the problem of searching for infected
individuals by grouping (or pooling) samples. Consider a population of N individuals, broken
up into k groups of N/k members each. If the probability that any individual is infected (the
prevalence) is p, the probability that a group is free of infection is (1 − p)N/k. Conversely, the
probability that at least one member is infected is p′ = 1− (1− p)N/k. Dorfman’s strategy was to
test all groups, and then to test every member of every infected group. The expected number of
tests is then
〈T 〉 = k + p′N, (A1)
and the number of tests required per person is
〈T 〉
N
=
k
N
+ p′ =
k
N
+ 1− (1− p)N/k ≈ k
N
+ p
N
k
. (A2)
In the last step, we assumed the prevalence p to be small. The number of tests per person is
minimised for k =
√
pN , and the optimal group size is 1/
√
p. The expected number of tests per
person, at the optimal group size, is approximately 2
√
p.
Let us compare these results with those obtained using our hypercube algorithm. Assuming
Poisson statistics, the expected number of tests per person is given by
〈T 〉
N
=
e−λ
N
(
1 + e lnN
∞∑
m=1
λm
m!
rm
)
≈ e
−pN
N
+ pe lnN (A3)
where rm denotes the number of runs of our hypercube algorithm needed to identify all infected
individuals. Each run consists of e lnN tests. We shall ignore any changes in the argument of the
logarithm due to fewer than N tests sometimes being needed. These changes are unimportant at
large N . For m = 1, 2 or 3, rm = m. For larger m, more than m runs may be needed. Setting
rm = m + cm for m > 3, the cm denote the average excess number of runs. They are tedious but
straightforward to compute. The first few are: c4 =
1
3 , c5 =
16
33 , c6 =
37
54 . In any case, they turn
out to be unimportant, because the minimum of (A3) is dominated by contributions from low m.
The last expression in (A3) represents the approximation that the cm corrections are neglected.
The first term diverges at small N , and the second diverges at large N . Thus, a minimum exists.
It is located at λ = pN ≈ 0.350, independent of p. For such a small value of λ, contributions
from higher m are strongly suppressed. One subtlety is that, at very low p, since N = λ/p, for
the relevant values of λ the argument of the logarithm becomes very large, so its derivative with
respect to λ becomes suppressed with respect to its value. This effect means that, for extremely
small p, the derivative of the corrections can compete with the derivative of the logarithm. We
have checked that only for p < 10−10 does this alter the minimum value of λ by more than 0.01.
Hence, for all practical purposes, we can safely ignore the cm corrections.
The optimal group size and the corresponding minimal number of tests per person are thus
given, to an excellent approximation, by
N ≈ 0.350
p
;
〈T 〉
N
≈ ep ln
(
0.734
p
)
. (A4)
6For a prevalence p of 1 per cent, Dorfman’s approach yields a group size of approximately 10
and approximately 0.2 tests per person, whereas ours yields a group size of 35 and 0.12 tests per
person. For a prevalence of 0.1 per cent, Dorfman’s optimal group size is 32 whereas ours is 350.
His approach requires 0.06 tests per person, whereas ours needs only 0.018. For all lower, bit still
reasonable, values of p our approach prevails by an increasing margin.
Appendix B: Information theory bound
Information theory sets a lower bound on the number of tests required to uniquely identify all
infected individuals. The uncertainty in who is infected is associated with an entropy,
S = −
∑
i
pi ln pi, (B1)
where the sum is over all possible states and the pi are the corresponding probabilities. If a
test outputs a zero or a one then for t tests the number of possible test outputs is 2t and the
corresponding information gained is at most t ln 2. In order to learn everything about the system,
one requires an information gain of at least S, hence
t >
S
ln 2
. (B2)
Consider a sample of size n, with k infected individuals chosen at random. The number of such
states is
(
n
k
)
. Therefore, from (B2), the minimum number of tests required is log2
(
n
k
) ∼ k log2(n/k)
for k  n. Assuming a binomial distribution with prevalence p, and replacing k with its expectation
p n, we find the expected number of tests per person is ∼ p log2(1/p). Binary searches can approach
this limit by performing an adaptive series of tests (see, e.g, Refs. [9, 10]). However, the number of
tests in each search scales as log2N ∼ log2(1/p) for the optimal value of N , at low p. In contrast,
the most efficient known parallel searches, called “noiseless, nonadaptive” tests in Ref. [11], require
a factor of e ln 2 more tests (see their equations (2.8) and (2.10)), just as our algorithm does.
